Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

1-9-1953

People v. Costa [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Costa [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 325.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/325

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

160

PEOPLE

!Crim. No. :1370.

v.

Cos·rA

In Bank.

l40 C.2d

,Jan. 9, 1953.]

THE PEOPI,E, 1\espomlcnt, v. NORMAN HOBER'l' COS'l'A,
Appellant.
[1] Negligence-Gross Negligence.-Gross nPgligence is want of
slight diligence, an entire failure to exercise care, or the
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief
that there was an indifference to the things and welfare of
others and that want of eare which would raise a presumption
of the conscious indifference to consequences.

[2] Homicide-Evidence-State of Mind of Defendant.-In prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, the fact that,
less than one-half hour before the accident, an officer who
stopped defendant called his attention to the conditions of his
probationary operator's license and the dangers of high speed
driving is relevant to the issue whether his act of driving at
a high rate of speed after having consumed alcoholic beverages
was mere inadvertence or disclosed a conscious indifference
to consequences.
[3] !d.-Evidence-Proof of Other Crimes.-In prosecution of
automobile driver for manslaughter, even if evidence as to
defendant's having been eautioned by an officer less than
one-half hour before the accident as to the dangers of high
speed driving tends to show a previous crime, such evidence
would not be inadmissible for the purpose of showing whether
his act of driving at a high rate of speed after having consumed alcoholic beverages was mere inadvertence or disclosed
a conscious indifference to eonsequences.
[ 4] Criminal Law- Evidence- Other Crimes.--Except when it
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any faet
material for the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact
sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it
may conneet the aeeused with an offense not included in the
charge.

[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence,§ 7; Am.Jur., Negligenee, §§ 4:3, 47.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law,~ 168 et Req.; Am.Jur., Evidenee,
§ 310 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] N egligenee, § 7; [2] Homicide, §58;
[3] Homicide, §102; [4] Criminal Law, §393(2); [5] Homieide,
~ 262; [6] Homieide, ~ 247; [7, 9] Homieide, § 117; [8] Criminal
Law, §510; flO] Criminal Law, §1382(12); [11] Homieide,
~ 148(2).
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(5]

Homicide-Appeal~~Harmless

Error-Admission of Evidence.
prosecution of automobilP dri\·er for manslaughter, any
PJTor in 11rlmission of testimony with regard to defendant's
conditional opPrator's liePnsP, the conditions of which had
expired prior to the date of the accident, was not prejudicial
where there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt
exclusive of the challenged testimony. ( Const., art. VI, § 4%.)
16] Id.- Appeal- Objections- Evidence.-On appeal from an
automobile driver's conviction of manslaughter, such driver
may not successfully complain that officer's remark that, prior
to stopping driver, he had stopped "another law violator,"
where no objection was made to such statement, nor did counsel for driver move to strike it as unresponsive or a conclusion of the witness, and where, in any event, it cannot be
said that such comment in the common parlance of the police
force was prejudicial.
[7] Id.- Evidence- Res Gestae- Statements of Deceased.-In
prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, statement
by deceased after he regained consciousness was not inadmissible because of the lapse of some five to ten minutes after
the accident, where due to the fact that he was unconscious
during this interval he could not have been planning his remarks or reconstructing the occurrence in his mind, and the
situation of itself satisfied the requirements of the res gestae
rule.
f81 Criminal Law-Evidence-Res Gestae.--Declarations to be a
part of the res gestae, are not required to be precisely concurrent in point of time with the principal fact; if they spring
out of the principal transaction and tend to explain it, are
voluntary and spontaneous, and are made at a time so near it
as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, then they are regarded as contemporaneous and are admissible.
[9] Homicide-Evidence-Res Gestae-Statements of Deceased.In prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, statement by deceased which otherwise meets the tests of the res
gestae rule is not inadmissible merely because it was made
in response to the question "What happened?" where the officer asking the question did not engage in any extended interrogation which may have led the deceased to deliberate in an
effort to explain what happened or to defend his own actions.
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Admission of Evidence.-In prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter
as result of accident involving another vehicle, any error in
admitting deceased's statement in evidence was not prejudicial
~-o-ln

[R] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 662 et seq.
40 C.2d--6

~

190 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
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wlH•re defPmlant admitted tlJat he struck the other vehicle
from tht> J"Pa1·, whinh was tlw ouly import of' tht> rPmnrk marlt>
hy dt>ePa:-wd.
[11] Homicide-Evidence-Manslaughter.--A conviction of automobile driver for manslaughter as result of accident involving
another vehicle is sustained by evidence tending to prove that
defendant, traveling at a speed approaching 90 miles per hour
aft<~r having consumed several alcoholic drinks, pulled out
into the passing lane directly behind the other vehicle which
already was occupying that space and traveling at a legal rate
of speed, and without noticeably reducing his spe~d rammed
the other vehicle, such conduct demonstrating an entire failure
to exercise care and a conscious indifference to consequences
and therefore being sufficient to show that he was guilty of
gross negligence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
,Joa<Juin County. 'fhomas B. Quinn, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for manslaughter.
affirmed.

Judgment of conviction

Smith & Zeller and Charles A. Zeller for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Gail A. Strader,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Norman Robert Costa was convicted by
the court, sitting without a jury, of manslaughter committed
in the driving of an automobile.
During early morning hours, Costa was driving a Cadillac
automobile around the countryside with three other young
men. All of them had been drinking and, at one time during the morning, Costa stopped and purchased a half-case
of beer. Earlier, he had consumed three or four whisky
highballs. He and his passengers drank some of the beer
while they drove, Costa having had two cans of it shortly before the accident. By stipulation of the parties, a chemist's
report was admitted into evidence showing that, about two
and one-half hours after the collision, Costa's blood had an
alcoholic content of .12 per cent.
Over objection, evidence was admitted that Costa's operator's license was conditional, although the conditions had
expired prior to the date of the wreck. The conditions were
that Costa should not "drive while drinking" and must
not speed.
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Approximately one-half hour before the collision occurred,
Costa was stopped by Wen dell Nicol, a state highway patrolman. Objections to most of the officer's testimony were overruled. He stated, ''I had just had another violator stopped
when I first observed him (Costa)." At that time, he estimated, Costa was driving '' [b] etween 50 and 60 miles an
hour" along a two-lane side road which intersects the freeway, a divided four-lane highway. The officer pursued Costa
for approximately 4 miles before catching up with him,
during a portion of which distance Costa drove on the freeway at a speed of about 70 miles per hour. ·when Nicol
finally was able to come close enough to clock the speed of
Costa's automobile it was again on a side road and had
~-;lowed to 55 miles per hour.
Costa gave Nicol no explanation for his speed. He "just
Htated that he realized he was wrong and that he shou]dn 't
have been doing that." The officer noticed that Costa's
driver's license "was a probationary license and I didn't
want to prosecute the man unfairly by issuing him a citation without being definite as to his speed so I reprimanded
him for driving like that and warned him that he had a
probationary license and that if he got a citation or was
in violation of the law that he would lose his license and
he assured me that he would drive more carefully in the
future, and I released him on that basis." The odor of
Costa's breath indicated that Costa had been drinking, hut
''not enough . . . to cause him to be examined.''
Another witness who had been driving along the freeway
on the morning of the accident testified, over objection, that
about six or seven minutes before the collision he observed
the Costa automobile traveling at approximately 85 to 90
miles per hour. Shortly thereafter, Costa passed a state
highway patrol car parked, with its motor running, about
100 to 150 feet off tbe opposite side of the freeway. The
two offieers in the patrol car estimated the speed of the Costa
automobile to he iu "exeess of 80" miles per hour, "between
Pighty and eighty-five." They immediately started in pursuit, driving across the freeway and turning left to follow
Costa.. In chasing him for approximately 2 miles, the police
ear reached a top speed of about 92 miles per hour. No
signal vvas given Costa to stop.
Earl Sk(~d, the driver of the police ear, testified at tbe preliminary examination, the transcript of which was admitted
into evidence by stipulation. He said that the Costa auto.
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mobile passed other vehicles to the left in the ''passing lane''
and then returned each time to the right lane. He kept
watching the "large taillights of the Cadillac'' for a mile
or one and one-half miles, meanwhile following in the passing lane.
When the police car had reached a point approximately
one-quarter of a mile behind the Cadillac, he could see "headlights other than the Cadillac up in the near vicinity of the
Cadillac; suddenly, he saw a set of taillights divert sharply
to the left . . . off the roadway at a very abrupt manner;
there was a cloud of dust and for a second our vision was
obscured from the dust, a tree in the road.'' He stated: ''I
did not see the lights that abruptly turned off prior to the
accident; there was another car to the right of the Cadillac.''
The other automobile was traveling in the right-hand lane,
but its lights were not the ones which he saw veer off the
highway. He explained that he was concentrating on his
driving and his attention was focused on the Cadillac. He
saw only two cars, he said, and "didn't know there was any
Jeep there.''
When he reached the scene of the accident, Officer Sked
brought the police car to a stop behind the Cadillac. The
automobile which had been traveling in the right-hand lane
pulled off on the shoulder of the highway and stopped temporarily. However, according to Officer Sked, "due to the
excitement of the moment they got away before we could
contact them." He asked Costa for his driver's license and
Costa handed it to him ''stating that it was a conditional
license." Officer Skeel stated: "I looked the car over and
I noticed some canned beer in the back and I asked him
about that and he says yes that he had had a couple of
drinks and he guessed that he was driving a little bit too
fast.''
I,ee Marshall, a state highway patrolman riding with Officer
Skeel, testified: "I could see a triangle of three lights, three
taillights. . . . There was a taillight in the right hand lane,
one in the center lane and the Cadillac in behind.'' This
was about 10 or 15 seconds before the crash and the Cadillac
was traveling in the right-hand Jane. Then the Cadillac, according to Officer Marshall, "moved over" and "blotted out
the taillights" of the v<~hirlr in thr left lane and "all at once
a set of taillights went off in a sharp curve.'' He said that
the jeep was in the left-hand lane and the Cadillac turned
into the left-hand lane and ran into the jeep and knocking
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him off the road.'' Aer~ording to l1im, only two or three
sreondR elapsed between the time the f;osta ear turned into
tlle left lane and the collision.
After the accident, the jeep lay, on its left side, off the
highway in the dividing strip. The four occupants were
unconscious and tangled in the wreckage. George D. Marino,
who, it is stipulated, died as a result of the accident, was
lying along the left side of the jeep. Between five and ten
minutes later, Officer Marshall talked to him. Over objection, Officer Marshall was permitted to testify as to this
conversation. Marino said he had been driving the jeep.
In response to the question, "What happened 1" Marino
said, "The man hit us in the rear."
None of the occupants of the jeep testified at Costa's trial.
One of the passengers in Costa's automobile was asleep when
the accident occurred and had no knowledge of how it happened. A second was not called. The testimony of the third
passenger, a member of the armed forces, was given by deposition.
This witness said that he was sitting on the right-hand
side of the back seat. According to him, the Cadillac speedometer registered 90 miles per hour shortly before the
crash. He first saw the jeep about 40 yards ahead of
them when the Cadillac was in the left lane beside another automobile to its right. He did not see the jeep
swerve into the left lane, it was there when he first noticed
it. He saw ''the whole back part of the Jeep'' from the
spare tire up. Realizing that there would be a crash, he
called to his friend in the front seat to duck and threw himself to the floor in the back. He did not see the collision.
Costa, testifying on his own behalf, said that he was driving about 70 or 75 miles per hour immediately prior to the
accident. He stated that he pulled over to the left lane to
pass a slower moving vehicle ahead of him in the right lane.
Before so doing, he saw no other vehicle ahead in the left
lane. He glanced to the left and right to be certain that he
was clear at an intersection and then momentarily looked
to the right to see if he had clearance around the automobile
he was passing. According to Costa, ".As I was passing
it, . . . I looked up and I saw the vehicle I hit." It was
entirely within the left lane, about 60 feet in front of his
automobile, and "was on an angle." He said: "It was
directly in front of me but to me it was at an angle and
my left front hit the left rear corner of it." He tried to
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apply his brakes before the eollision, but things happened
rapidly that he did not nc·all whether be was snncessful
in so doing.
In support of his appeal from the judgment of conviction,
Costa contends that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in the admission of evidence concerning the warning
given him for speeding earlier in the morning, the conditional license which he held, and the statement by Marino
after he regained consciousness. He also claims that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment. The attorney general disputes each of these contentions.
The statute under which Costa was convicted provides:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice . . . . 3. In the driving of a vehicle-(a) In
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony
with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with
gross negligence." (Pen. Code, § 192.3[a].) [1] "Gross
negligence has been repeatedly defined in the California cases
as 'the want of slight diligence,' 'an entire failure to exercise care, or the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the things
and welfare of others,' and 'that want of care which would
raise a presumption of the conscious indifference to consequences.' " (Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal.2d 504, 510-511 [42
P.2d 59] ; Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal.2d 116, 123 [208 P.2d 367] ;
Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d 226, 232-233 [70 P.2d 183, 112
A.L.R. 407] ; Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 46-47 [8 P.2d
474] ; Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 654-655 [293 P. 62,
77 A.L.R. 1327] .)
[2] An important question in the prosecution, therefore,
was what Costa's actions, as related to the surrounding circumstances, disclosed concerning his state of mind. Was
his act of driving at a high rate of speed after having consumed alcoholic beverages mere inadvertence, or did it diselose a conscious indifference to consequences? The fact that,
less than one-half hour before the accident, an officer who
stopped him called his attention to the conditions of his operator's license and the dangers of high speed driving was
relevant to this issue.
[3] Costa concedes that the evidence did not disclose a
"previous violation of law." Therefore, there is little merit
to his argument that it ''must necessarily have had an inflammatory effect upon the mind of the Court." However,
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even if it tended to show a previous crime, it would not have
been inadmissible for the purposes for which it was introduced. [4] "It is settled in this state that except when it
t>hows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material
for the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought
to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may
connect the accused with an offense not included in the
eharge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509 [218 P.2d
981]; People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491, 499-500 [197 P.2d 1];
People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 314-315 [169 P.2d 924].)
According to Costa, ''The prosecution offered and there
was received in evidence, over the appropriate objection of
the defendant, extensive testimony with regard to a conditional license, the conditions of which had expired prior to
the date of the accident in question.'' He points to his own
testimony upon cross-examination as having been erroneously
admitted over objection. .Although thorough, it hardly warrants the use of the adjective "extensive." He admitted,
without objection, that his license was conditional. Objection was made, and overruled, to only two questions. The
reply to the first established that his conditional license had
not been replaced by an unrestricted license at the time of
the accident. 'l'he second question dealt with the conditions
of his license.
[5] If it be assumed that the admission of this evidence
was erroneous, it was not prejudicial. .A careful examination
of the entire record in accordance with article VI, section
41;2 of the Constitution, diseloses overwhelming evidence of
Costa's guilt exclusive of all the challenged testimony. Under
the circumstances, it cannot be said that the admission of
evidence concerning his conditional license resulted in a miscarriage of justice which would justify a reversal of the
judgment. (Const., art. VI, § 4¥2; cf. People v. Dabb, supra,
p. 501.)
[6] It is argued that "the volunteer remark of the officer
[Nicol), that prior to stopping Costa he had stopped 'another law violator' " was inadmissible. No objection was
made to the officer's statement and counsel for Costa did
not move to strike it as unresponsive or a conclusion of
the witness. In any event, it cannot be said that this comment in the common parlance of the police force was in
any sense prejudicial.
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[7] Costa contends that the statement by Marino after he
regained consciousness was inadmissible because the lapse of
some five to ten minutes removed it from the operation of
the res gestae rule. However, during this interval Marino
was unconscious and could not have been planning his remarks or reconstructing the occurrence in his mind. The situation of itself satisfied the requirements of the res gestae
rule. [8] ''Declarations to be a part of the res gestae, are
not required to be precisely concurrent in point of time with
the principal fact, if they spring out of the principal transaction, if they tend to explain it, are voluntary and spontaneous, and are made at a time so near it as to preclude
the idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded
as contemporaneous, and are admissible." (People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 51 [95 Am.Dec. 49]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1850;
Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Cal.2d 575, 581-584
[160 P.2d 21] ; Showalter v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 16 Cal.
2d 460, 465-470 [106 P.2d 895].)
[9] Upon oral argument, Costa raised, for the first time,
the contention that Marino's statement was not spontaneous
because it was made in response to a question by Officer Marshall. This argument has no merit. The officer did not engage in any extended interrogation of Marino which might
have led the latter to deliberate in an effort to explain what
happened or to defend his own actions. He simply made the
inquiry which anyone arriving upon the scene might have
asked the injured man, ''What happened~'' The response
was voluntary and spontaneous and the circumstances precluded the idea of deliberation.
In Showalter v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., supra, the statement held to be admissible was made in response to the
question, ''How in the world did it happen, Joe~'' The reply
to a question as to ''where the other car came from'' was
}JC]d to be admissible as a part of the res gestae in Lane v.
Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra. It would be unreasonable
to prohibit evidence concerning spontaneous declarations in
every case where they are prompted by a simple inquiry as
to what oeeurred. 'l'he natural reaction of anyone arriving
at the pla<~e where a11 a<,cideut haR occurred is to make suel1
inquiry. 'I'he rnle for which Costa eontends would, in effect,
bar resort to the res gestae doetrine in virtually every case
of accidental injury. If the statement otherwise meets the
tests of the res gestae rule, it should not be held inadmissible

Jan.

193~3 J

PEOPLE

v. Cos'l'A

169

[40 C.2d 160; 252 P.2d 1]

simply hP<·am;r; it was promptPil by the question of another
rerson.
[10] If it be assumed that the trial court, in its discretion, should not have admitted Marino's statement in evidence, the error was not prejudicial. Costa admits that he
struck the jeep from the rear, which is the only import
of the remark made by Marino. It does not tend in any
manner to refute Costa's argument that he hit the left rear
~~orner of the jeep, rather than striking it squarely. Marino
did not say what portion of the rear of the jeep was hit.
[11] Costa's final contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment cannot be sustained. The
evidence is conflicting, but is amply sufficient to have convinced the trial court that Costa was guilty of gross negligence. It tends to prove that Costa, traveling at a speed
approaching 90 miles per hour after having consumed several
alcoholic drinks, pulled out into the passing lane directly
behind the jeep which already was occupying that space
and traveling at a legal rate of speed. Without noticeably
reducing his speed, he rammed the smaller vehicle. Such
conduct demonstrates an entire failure to exercise care and
a conscious indifference to consequences.
The judgment is affirmed.
Uibson, C.•T., Shenk, .T., 'l'raynor, .J., and Spence, .T., concurred.
Schauer, .J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance and
agree generally with the reasoning upon which it is based.
I do not, however, agree with that portion of the majority
opinion which holds that evidence of other crimes than that
with which the defendant is charged may be admitted even
though such evidence may tend to connect the defendant with
the crime charged. No such evidence was offered in this case
and therefore the discussion on this subject is dictum. My
position with respect to the admission of evidence of other
crimes than that with which a defendant is charged is set
forth in my dissents in the following cases: People v. Peete,
28 Cal.2d 306 [169 P.2d 924) and People v. Westek, 31 Cal.
2d 469 [190 P.2d 9].
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
fi, 1953.

